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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OP THE STATE OF UTAH 
TECHNOMEDICAL LABS, IN-- a 
Utah Corporation, and 
CONNECTIONS MARKETING CORP., 
a Nevada Corp. (formerly 
TPI. INC.), 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
UTAH SECURITIES DIVISION, 
and JOHN C. BALDWIN, its 
Director, UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
BUSINESS REGULATION, and 
WILLIAM E. DUNN, its Executive 
Director, and the SECURITIES 
ADVISORY BOARD, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 20516 
ISSUES 
1 i •• r i s sued by the S e c u r i t i e s D iv i -
s i o n rat iona l and reasonable? 
2. Do the appe l lants qual i fy as n o n - i s s u e r s in oidf.i 
to regitiLer by n o t i f i c a t i o n , under Utah Code Ann. $, 61-1-8(1) (b) 
(Supp. 1983)? 
3 . Did t h i ' E x e c u t i v e P i i e r ' - i H i i i t i u t I ' m a t im-
properly place the burden of proof on tue appel lants? 
4. Did the Executive Director and the District Court 
err in not making a determination as to Count II of the Divi-
sion's petition? 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about February 15, 1984, the Utah Securities Di-
vision received applications from appellants to register securi-
ties of several corporations pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-
8(1)(b) (Supp. 1983). Although each of the applications is in-
dependent of the others, all seek to take advantage of the same 
registration provisions under the above cited act. All were 
filed at the same time and in some instances the corporations 
share common officers and directors. See Appendix C. Pursuant 
to the stipulation of attorneys of record, the applications and 
related proceedings were consolidated in the administrative pro-
ceeding. (Pre-hearing p.l). 
Appellants are Utah corporations which soon after their 
incorporation on April 26, 19 83, undertook a public offering in 
reliance upon the so called "intrastate" exemption provided by 
Section 3(a)(11) under the Securities Act of 1933; therefore, 
no federal filing was made. Immediately following the completion 
of appellants' initial public offerings, appellants organized 
certain new corporations and paid to those corporations from 
$1,000.00 to $2,750.00 in exchange for from 750,000 to 2,750,000 
shares in the new corporations. As a result of these transac-
tions, each appellant became the parent of a wholly-owned subsid-
iary: 
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Appellant/Parent: TPI, Inc.; Date of Incorporation: 
April 26, 1983; 
gubsidiary: TPI Landf Inc.; Date of Incorporation; 
February 9, 1984; Total Offering: 750,000 shares; Total Offering 
Amount: $1,000; Proposed Date of Distribution: February 21, 
1984. 
Appellant/Parent: Technomedical Labs, Inc; Date of 
Incorporation: April 26, 1983; 
gubsidiary: Technomedical Properties, Inc., Date of 
Incorporation: February 9, 1984; Total Offering: 750,000; Total 
Offering Amount: $1,000; Proposed Date of Distribution: Febru-
ary 21, 1984. (Findings p.2). 
As indicated by the Stipulations, the subsidiaries1 
stated business purposes are, "investing in investments of all 
forms and nature." Appellants stipulated that the subsidiaries 
have limited capitalization and that each subsidiary is a "devel-
opment stage company." (Stipulations pp.4 and 6). Appellants 
indicate in their brief that the subsidiaries have no operating 
history or business experience and that the considerations re-
ceived from appellants are the subsidiaries1 sole assets. (Brief 
p.11). The subsidiaries of appellants in this case received 
$1000.00 each for their shares. (Findings p.4). 
Immediately after the organization of the subsidiaries 
and the issuance of their stock to the parents (appellants) , ap-
pellants filed an application to register the stock issued by the 
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subsidiaries by notification. Appellants claimed they qualified 
to register by notification as "non-issuers" under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 61-l-8(b) but appellants1 purpose for registering was to dis-
tribute shares of the subsidiaries to appellants1 shareholders as 
a partial liquidating dividend pending approval of the sharehold-
ers. (Findings p.3). 
Before 3:00 o'clock on February 7, 1984, (within the 
time requirement set forth in Section 61-1-8) the Division issued 
Petitions and Orders to Show Cause why Stop Orders should not be 
issued. A time and date for the Pre-Hearing Conference was also 
set. (Findings p.6). 
The Division's Petition contained three counts as fol-
lows: 
(1.) Appellants do not come under the definition of 
"non-issuer" set forth in Section 61-1-13(12) U.C.A.f because the 
distribution of said stock will be directly or indirectly for the 
benefit of the subsidiaries. Therefore, appellants are not qual-
ified to register by notification which constitutes grounds for a 
Stop Order denying effectiveness to the securities registration 
contained in Section 61-1-12(1)(b) U.C.A.. 
(2.) Appellants registration application alleges that 
the stock in question was originally issued pursuant to an exemp-
tion from registration contained in Sections 61-1-14(2)(a) and 
(u) U.C.A.. Howeverf the stock in question was originally issued 
through transactions which do not constitute exemptions under 
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sections 61-1-14(2)(a) and (n) which precludes said stock from 
being eligible for registration by notification as set forth in 
61-1-8. 
(3.) The intended distribution of the stock in ques-
tion would tend to work a fraud upon purchasers or would so op-
erate, because, in part, subsidiaries are undercapitalized for 
stated business purposes; subsidiaries have no plans for either 
generating revenue or increasing its capitalization. (See: 
Petition of Division). 
The Order coming from the pre-hearing conference, dis-
missed Count III, because it was too speculative. Thus, at the 
administrative level only Counts I and II were to be decided. 
The parties stipulated that there was no need to con-
vene a hearing, and that the matters could be argued on the law 
by written memoranda based upon the facts contained in the stip-
ulation of the parties and the registration statements. Thus, 
the Executive Director proceeded accordingly. (Pre-hearing p.2). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASS 
On or about March 19, 1984, Administrative Law Judge, 
Kent Walgren, submitted his recommended Findings of Fact, Conclu-
sions of Law, and Order to the Division. He concluded that ap-
pellants did not qualify as non-issuers within the definition 
provided in Section 61-1-13 U.C.A., and therefore, could not 
avail themselves of registration by notification. Walgren found 
that no decision was necessary regarding Count II because appel-
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lants1 proposed transaction disqualified them as non-issuers. On 
or about April 17f 1985, the Executive Director (Director) and 
the Advisory Board of the Securities Division adopted the Find-
ings of Walgren and issued Stop Orders denying the effectiveness 
of appellants1 registration statements. 
On June 12/ 1984, appellants filed a petition in the 
Third District Court of Salt Lake County to have the Division1s 
Order vacated. Upon review. Judge David B. Dee affirmed the 
Director's findings and conclusions. 
Appellants are now before this Court generally seeking 
a reversal of the District Court's decision. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Respondents wi l l demonstrate t ha t the Executive Direc-
t o r ' s Stop Order, placed on a p p e l l a n t s ' attempted r e g i s t r a t i o n 
was r a t i o n a l and reasonable and supported by the D i r e c t o r ' s f ind-
ings and conclusions* Therefore, t h i s Court should affirm the 
Stop Orders and the D i s t r i c t Cour t ' s holding. 
I. THE STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR THIS COURT IS LIMITED TO DETER-
MINING WHETHER THE SECURITIES DIVISION WAS ARBITRARY AND 
CAPRICIOUS. 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-23(1) (Supp. 1983) l i m i t s the 
scope of review of t h i s Court to determining whether the Execu-
t i v e D i r e c t o r ' s decis ion i s supported by competent, mater ia l and 
s u b s t a n t i a l evidence. 
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Without doubt, the best case in contemporary Utah law 
to enunciate the principles governing review of administrative 
decisions in Utah Department of Administrative Services v. Public 
Service Commission, 658 P.2d 601 (Utah 1983)• 
Although the Court in Administrative Services dealt, 
not with the review standards of the Securities Division, but 
instead with the review standards applicable to Public Service 
Commission decisions, nonetheless, the Court recognized the ap-
plicability of the review standards set forth to administrative 
bodies generally. Xd. at 608, note 7. 
The Court enumerated three standards of review; (1) 
"general law—correction of error," (2) "findings of fact—evi-
dence of any substance whatever," and (3) "other decisions— 
reasonableness or rationality." 
The "general law-correction of error" standard "in-
clude Es] interpretation^] of the United States Constitution 
and the Acts of the Legislature (except those defined below as 
special laws)." Xd. at 608. With respect to such interpreta-
tions no deference is given to administrative constructions. Id. 
The "findings of fact—evidence of any substance what-
ever" standard of review extends to "findings on questions of 
basic fact (which do not include 'ultimate facts1 and the appli-
cation of legal rules to basic facts . . . ) . Id. With respect 
thereto, a court may overturn administrative findings "only where 
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they are 'so without foundation in fact' that they "must be deem-
ed capricious and arbitrary.1 Xd. (emphasis in original). In 
other words, administrative findings of fact require affirmance 
if there is a scintilla of evidence to support them. 
Finally, the "other decisions—reasonableness or ra-
tionality" include "what has been described as 'mixed questions 
of law and fact' or the 'application of findings of basic facts' 
(e.g., what happened) to the legal rules governing the case . . . 
and what can be called questions of 'special law.'" Xd. at 610. 
Special law "are interpretations of the operative provisions of 
the statutory law it [the administrative body] is empowered to 
administer, especially those generalized terms that bespeak a 
legislative intent to delegate their interpretation to the re-
sponsible agency." Xd. In reviewing "agency decisions of this 
type . . . a court should afford great deference to the technical 
expertise or more extensive experience of the responsible agen-
cy." id. Agency decisions "must fall within the limits of rea-
sonableness or rationality." Xd. 
The test for reasonableness is that the Agency's order 
"must be determined with reference to the specific terms of the 
underlying legislation, interpreted in light of its evident pur-
pose as revealed in the legislative history and in light of the 
public policy sough to be served." 658 P.2d at 611. 
Under the above standard of review this Court should 
find that the Executive Director's decision to issue the stop 
order was rationale and reasonable, was based on sound conclu-
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sions of law and fact, and was done in pursuit of the Division's 
legislative purpose of administering and enforcing the State's 
securities laws. 
II. THE DIRECTOR'S STOP ORDER IS RATIONAL AND REASONABLE 
AND WAS ISSUED PURSUANT TO THE DIVISION1S LEGISLATIVE 
PURPOSE OP ADMINISTERING AND ENFORCING THE STATE'S 
SECURITIES LAWS. 
The State of Utah is one of many states which has ad-
opted the Uniform Securities Act. 7B U.L.A. § 101 p.509 (1985). 
The purpose of the Act, as stated by many Courts, is to "protect 
through disclosure" State v. Williams, 563 P.2d 1270, 1272, 17 
Wash.App. 368 (1977); "to prevent fraud and protect the public 
against imposition of unsubstantial schemes, Commissioner of Sec-
urities y. Hawaii Market Center Inc,. 485 p.2d 105 (19 ); to 
provide "disclosure of information sufficient to allow informed 
decision making by investors, Lowery v. Food Hill Inv. Co., 556 
P.2d 1201, 1207 note 6, 192 Colo. 125, (1976). 
Immediately preceding Section 61-1-1 of the Utah Sec-
urities Act, U.C.A. (Supp. 1983), the legislature inserted a note 
which states the purpose of the Utah Securities Division: 
Title of Act. 
An act relating to securities; providing 
for a securities division to administer and 
enforce state securities laws? authorizing 
the division to set registration and examina-
tion fees; modifying bond requirements for 
registered broker-dealers and investment 
advisers; providing summary power to deny 
registration applications; modifying coordin-
ated filing requirements; limiting the exten-
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sion period on summary orders; providing and 
modifying definition; providing and modifying 
exemptions from registration; providing for a 
securities advisory board; increasing inter-
est charges for violations brought by private 
litigants; providing additional penalties for 
securities violations; increasing the ceiling 
on criminal fines for violation of securities 
law; and authorizing the division to classify 
specific acts as unlawful, (Emphasis added). 
This legislative note, in the same spirit of the above 
cited cases, clearly illustrates the Legislature's intent that 
the Utah Securities Division be given discretion and flexibility 
to pursue the enforcement of State securities laws. The most 
important aspect of enforcing the securities laws, indicated in 
the above cited cases, is to provide potential securities pur-
chasers the benefit of the enumerated maximum disclosure require-
ments set forth for the three methods of registration. (§§ 61-1-
8, 9, and 10 U.C.A.). 
Under the Utah Code, the Executive Director may issue a 
stop order if he finds that the order is in the public interest 
61-1-12(1), and if the security sought to be registered by noti-
fication is not eligible for such registration (61-1-12(1)(g)). 
A. The Stop Order Was Made in The Public 
Interest. 
The Director found that if appellants1 shares were re-
gistered by notification, their intended distribution would have 
resulted in millions of shares in substantially weak companies 
(see facts) being made available for public trading, but regis-
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C. Registration by Notification Provides for 
Minimal Disclosure. 
Commentators who review the Uniform Securities Act, 
which was substantially adopted by Utah consistently find that 
registration by notification provides for minimal disclosure. 
See Bennett, Securities Regulation in Utah: A Recap, of History 
and the New Uniform Act, 8 Utah L.Rev. 216 (1963); Hill, Some 
Comments on the Uniform Securities Act, 55 NW.U.L.Rev. 661 
(1961); The Uniform Securities Act, 12 Stan. L.Rev. 105 (1959). 
The language and provisions in the act itself indicate 
that notification has the least amount of information required as 
compared to other methods of registration. This is explained in 
Section 7.01, Blue Sky Regulations, 11C (part 2) BUSINESS ORGANI-
ZATIONS (MB) (1984), pp. 7-4 to 7-15, as follows: 
[a]—Notification. Registration by 
notification is the simplest method of 
registration. It is set cut in Section 302 
of the Uniform Securities Act, and it has 
been adopted in the Blue Sky legislation of 
approximately twenty-eight states. The 
Uniform Act provides that this method is 
available to companies that have been in 
continuous operation for at least five years, 
that for the preceding three fiscal years 
have not defaulted in the payment of 
principal, interest or dividends of any 
security, and that have had average earnings 
of at least five percent on its common 
shares. A registration by notification 
statement must contain certain basic 
information about the issuer or any 
subsidiary thereof including name, address, 
form of organization, state in which 
organized, date of organization, character of 
the business, a description of the security, 
the proposed offering price, a description of 
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any stock options, ai id final icial data under 
certain conditions1-. Further, a copy of any 
prospectus or other sales literature must be 
submitted therewith. Finally, the Uniform 
Act provides thatf as long as there is no 
stop order in effect, a i: egistration by 
notification automatically takes effect at 
3:00 p.m. on the second full business day 
after the filing, ei at an earlier time if 
the Administrator determines. 
Several states that have opi.t- , -_<_• oifer 
this method of registration have taken the 
Uniform Act's provisions nearly verbatim. 
Other states have made changes to one degree 
or anothe most of the variation 
occurring ,ne effective !dt- provision. 
Alabama, . ; example, pr-^ les that the 
registration is effective n the fi.^.hf 
rather than the second fulJ bus : ne: •; ;../ 
after filing, while the Michigan statute 
calls for effectiveness on the twentieth day 
after filing. Another change made involves 
the period of time that an issuer must have 
been in business before registration by 
notification is possible. The Uniforir ;;t 
provides that there be f.ve-year 
prerequisite. The states < Hawaii, 
Louisian-:. Texas, and Vermont, however, 
provide thv* securities issuee by 
corporations t;.ji have been in operation for 
not :.ess than three years may register *~v^ r 
seeurnMo^ h- * t» notif icat • • r. process. 
.. • .o.-; dination. Reciit.uLiou u± 
coordination is available when a registration 
statement relating to the same offering of 
the same securities has been filed under trie 
Securities Act of 1933. It is found in -: ne 
Uniform Securities Act at Section 303, ,-r.d 
has been adopted in a majority of the states. 
Regis t r a t i o n 'l y this method avoids 
duplication by federal and state agencies; 
the information required to be filed with the 
various states is essentially the same as 
that filed with the SEC, ',nck:inc * ne 
prospectus and such other documents as are 
requested by an individual Commissioner. 
Registration by coordination automatica iy 
becomes effective when ttn- *ed-. nl 
registration becomes effect 
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order is in effect; (2) the registration has 
been on file with the State commissioner for 
ten days; and (3) a statement of the maximum 
and minimum proposed offering prices and the 
maximum underwriting discounts has been on 
file for two days. It is incumbent upon the 
registrant to notify each state's 
commissioner of the federal statement's 
effectiveness and the registrant must file a 
post-effective amendment, the commission may 
enter a stop order retroactively denying or 
suspending effectiveness until compliance is 
complete. 
[cl—Qualification. Registration by 
qualification is the most involved method of 
registration. The Uniform Securities Act 
Section 304 provides this alternative, and it 
has been adopted by approximately 43 states. 
This method is generally the last choice of 
an issuer, for the statute contains seventeen 
sub-sections listing information and 
documents that must accompany each 
application including: basic information 
about the issuer and any subsidiaries, if 
any, the character and location of its 
business, and the general competitive 
conditions in the industry; personal data 
about corporate officers and their security 
holdings including a description of any 
material interest or transaction effected 
between the issuer and the officer for a 
period of three years; remuneration paid to 
corporate officers during the previous twelve 
months; details relating to capitalization 
and long term debt; information about the 
securities such as price, estimated 
underwriting and selling discounts or 
commissions; cash proceeds expected from the 
offering, and the proposed use of such 
proceeds; a description and amount of any 
stock options; copies of any material 
contracts made otherwise than in the ordinary 
course of business; pending litigation; 
copies of any prospectus or sales literature 
to be used; a copy of the security being 
registered; an opinion of counsel as to the 
legality of the security being offered; 
consents from any professional, e.g., 
accountant, engineer, if such person is named 
as having prepared or certified a report used 
-14-
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The courts look for three elements to determine if such 
a "spin off" is being attempted: 
(1.) Infusion of new assets into the subsidiary in 
exchange for issuance of a controlling amount of shares; 
(2.) Distribution of the balance of subsidiaries 
shares to parent's shareholders which; 
(3.) Develops the public trading of subsidiaries 
shares. 
Haryyp Industries at 952. 
The term "spin off" is defined by Black's kaw Diction-
ary , 5th ed., as occurring "where part of [the] assets of [a] 
corporation is transferred to a new corporation and stock of the 
transferee is distributed to shareholders of the transferor with-
out surrender by them of stock in the transferor." 
In both Harwyn Industries and Datronics Engineers, the 
courts were asked to decide if the distributions of a subsidi-
ary's unregistered shares as a dividend to the parent's share-
holders constituted a "sale" requiring registration. Whether a 
"sale" within the 1933 Act had occurred depended upon whether the 
distribution was "for value." 
In both cases, the courts held that "benefits" would be 
gained by the creation of a public market, Harwyn at 952, for the 
shares were in fact for "value." Harwyn, at 954; Datronics, at 
253. For example, in Harwyn, the court said "benefits" to defen-
dants were several " . . . among which would be the "ability to 
market or hypothecate shares and to finance the subsidiary's 
operations could be greatly facilitated by the existence of an 
active trading market." 326 F. Supp. at 952 (emphasis added). 
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non-issuer distribution if effected without directly or indirect-
ly benefiting the issuer. The obvious purpose of § 61-1-8(1)(b) 
is to allow persons who have purchased or hold unregistered sec-
urities of the same class of a security which has been registered 
to distribute them without complying with the more costly disclo-
sure requirements of registration by qualification. Section 61-
1-8(1)(b) thus recognizes that once a company has an established 
public market, full-blown registration is not necessary because 
of the efficient market hypothesis and the free flow of informa-
tion. It also recognizes that non-issuers probably do not have 
access to the information necessary to comply with registration 
by qualification, hence the limitation to non-issuer distribu-
tions. See Draftsmen's Commentary to § 302(a), Uniform Securi-
ties Act. 
If the obvious rationale of § 61-1-8(1) (b) is accepted, 
it becomes immediately apparent that Appellants cannot be classi-
fied as nnon-issuersf" for to do so would strain and obfuscate 
the purpose of § 61-1-8(1)(b). Appellants seek access to § 61-1-
8(1) (b) for one reason, although they have attempted to obfuscate 
that as well by hiding behind a shareholder vote, namely, to take 
subsidiary companies public by spinning them off. All is done 
under the guise of compliance with the security laws, but at-
tempted in such fashion as to deny the investors the protection 
of the Act, to wit, full disclosure of a developmental stage 
company with no apparent business purpose and no future absent 
its public character. 
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fact is supported by the implication raised in § 61-l-12(b)(ii) 
U.C.A. that the issuer and a control person have a similar sta-
tus. 
The Securities and Exchange Commission defines "con-
trol" (including the terms controlling/ controlled byf and under 
common control with ) as "the possession/ direct or indirect/ of 
the power to direct or cause the direction of the management and 
policies of a person/ whether through the ownership of voting 
securities/ by contract/ or otherwise." SEC Rule 405(f) (17 CFR 
§ 230.405(f)). 
A California Court of Appeals has equated a control 
person with the issuer in People v. Mills, 148 Cal. App.2d 392/ 
306 P.2d 1005 (1957)
 f where the court held: "A sale of stock or 
other undivided interest in a corporation which is the sellers 
alter ego spells a sale by the issuer in legal contemplation." 
(Emphasis added). (But see: Fox v. Ehrmantraut, 28 Cal.3d 127/ 
615 P.2d 1383 167 Cal. Rptr. 595 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1980)). 
It is clear that when the facts of the instant case are 
applied to the foregoing rules of "underwriter"/ and "control 
person/issuer" appellants fit quite well into both definitions. 
If has been demonstrated above that appellants acquired all of 
the subsidiary's issuer's shares with the intent to distribute 
part or all of said shares, which makes them an underwriter by 
definition. And the fact that appellants own the majority of 
issuer's shares, makes them a control issuer. 
-20-
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The record indicates that at the pre-hearing conference 
both parties stipulated to several facts and agreed that there 
was no need to convene a hearing, and that the matters could be 
argued on the law by written memoranda. (Pre-hearing p.2). In 
both lower courts the judges reviewed the stipulated facts and 
the memoranda* (Findings p.2; Memo Decision p.l). 
In determining who has the burden of proof, the law 
states that the proponent of a proposition has the burden of 
producing a quantum of evidence which the law demands, and evi-
dence which tends to prove the proposition asserted; and to per-
suade the trier fact that his evidence is entitled to the greater 
weight. Once the proponent has produced such evidence, the bur-
den of producing evidence disproving the proposition shifts to 
the opponent. Koesling v. Basamakis, 539 P.2d 10 43, 10 46 (Utah 
1975); flaoman Vt North Western Mutual Life Insurance Co», 429 
P.2d 849, 851 (Idaho 1967). 
In the case at bar, the Division was the proponent and 
thereby had the burden. Moreover, the Division, statutorily had 
the burden due to the fact that they were alleging that appel-
lants did not come under the "non-issuer" definition which is one 
of the key arguments to support the stop order. 
The record shows that the District Court held that the 
Division had the burden to prove appellant1s were exempt from the 
non-issuer definition. However, this had no impact on the ade-
quacy of the Division's memorandum, because after reviewing the 
-22-
arguments of both sidesf the District Court accordingly found 
appellants arguments unpersuasive which is to sayf appellants 
failed to produce evidence which could disprove what the Division 
produced in its memorandum. 
In short/ the Division produced evidence in its memo-
randa and the stipulated facts which prove that appellants did 
not qualify to register by notification. The Directorf in review 
of appellants1 memorandum found appellants1 arguments and claims 
to be unpersuasivef which does not indicate that appellants had 
the burdenf but that they failed to produce evidence which could 
disprove what the Division had established. Therefore/ this 
Court should find that the burden of proof was not improperly 
placed on appellants. 
V. NO DECISION WAS NECESSARY WITH RESPECT TO COUNT II OF THE 
DIVISION'S PETITION. 
Count II of the Division's petition alleged that the 
transaction in which the shares in question were issued to appel-
lants did not constitute an exemption under §§ 61-1-14(2)(a) and 
(n) of the Actf thusf precluding said shares from being eligible 
for registration by notification. 
The Executive Director determined that since appellants 
do not qualify as non-issuers/ there is no need to determine whe-
ther the shares were previously issued under an exemption as part 
of the criteria for registration by notification under § 8(1)(b) 
of the Act. (Findings p.10). 
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The Executive Director did not state explicit reasons 
for not addressing this issuef but the District Court on review 
saw the decision as sound. The District Court correctly saw that 
finding the appellants to be non-issuers was a threshold issue 
which was enough to support the stop order thereby making the 
other issue mootf because a determination on whether the original 
distribution was exempt would have no bearing on the outcome. 
Therefore, further issue determination at this point would be an 
unreasonable expense of the Director's resources. (Memo Decision 
p.10) . 
In the alternative, the original distribution is not 
one that is exempt as an isolated transaction or a non-public 
offering from registration for purposes of registration by noti-
fication because that distribution is one step of an overall 
scheme for a public distribution. In SEC v. Mono-Kearsage Con 
Min. Co., 167 F.Supp. 24 8 (Utah 195 8) a Utah corporation, Mono-
Kearsage Consolidated Mining Company entered into an agreement 
with one James B. Boren, representing others whereby it would 
acquire certain oil and gas interests as consideration for the 
delivery of 51% (or majority control) of Mono-Kearsage stock to 
Boren. After receiving the stock, Boren and his associates com-
menced distributing the shares to the public. The stock was not 
registered with the SEC in accordance with the Act. Mono-Kear-
sage contended that the transaction whereby Boren received the 
shares from Mono was exempt under 15 USCA § 77D(c) as a trans-
action by an issuer not involving any public offering* 
-24-
The court stated that if the transaction to Boren and 
his associates were done with the view that they would have a 
continuing interest as long term investors in the success of the 
corporationf a private offering would be indicated. Such invest-
ors with such special knowledge of, and interest in, the corpor-
ation and in view of such continuing connection could well be 
considered a class able to fend for itself in a transaction not 
involving any public offering within the doctrine of SEC v. 
Ralston Purina Co.. [346 U.S. 119, 71 S.Ct. 981, 97 L.Ed. 1444 
(1953) . ] " 
The court went on to say, however, that nIf known to 
the company, or under circumstances reasonably placing it on no-
tice, . . ., Mono-Kearsage transferred stock to persons, however 
limited in number or well informed, who did not intend to treat 
it as investment stock but who claimed the right of immediate re-
distribution to the public . . . it properly could not claim by 
virtue of the mere form of the transaction that a private, rather 
than public, offering was involved. 
"In such an event, an issuer with impunity, through a 
limited group and by a transaction private in form only, for its 
own benefit and for such consideration as it might exact, could 
distribute to the public whatever quantities of stock if desired 
without protection to the public contemplated by law. Neither an 
issuer nor an underwriter may separate parts of a series of re-
lated transactions the totality of which is designed and known to 
-25-
constitute an unlimited offer and rely only upon that part which 
in form indicates that the offering was private." 167 F.Supp. at 
252. 
It has been established that appellants acquired the 
shares in questions with the purpose to distribute them to their 
shareholders which would make them available for public trading. 
Therefore, under the Mono-Kearsage holding, the first transaction 
between appellant and their subsidiaries does not qualify for an 
exemption. Even if appellants did qualify as non-issuers, the 
shares would not qualify for registration by notification. 
In summary, it was not necessary for the court to de-
termine Count II of the Division's petition. It was established 
that appellants are not non-issuers and do not qualify to regis-
ter by notification. 
In the alternative, the first distribution does not 
qualify for exemption as an isolated or non-public transaction. 
The transaction was made for the purpose of appellants to dis-
tribute the shares to its shareholders which would make the 
shares available for public trading* 
Even though the underlying reason in Hoiia was to pre-
vent unregistered securities from being publicly issued, and ap-
pellants are attempting to register the securities before distri-
buting them, the Mono, ruling should still be applied. The sub-
sidiaries, created by appellants, issued the shares to appellants 
with knowledge and notice that the shares would be distributed to 
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appellant's shareholders. The transaction therefore cannot be 
found to be isolated from the distribution nor can it be found 
to be non-public when it was only a mere step in an eventual pub-
lic distribution. Therefore, the Division had a similar reason 
as the Mono court to prevent the shares from becoming publicly 
available where the information required under registration by 
notification would not be adequate for shares coming from such 
weak companies. 
CONCLUSION 
It has been established that the Executive Director's 
findings and conclusions are sound, which under the scope of re-
view in Public Service Commission makes the Stop Order rationale 
and reasonable. The Statef thereforef respectfully asks this 
Court to affirm the Stop Order and the holding of the District 
Court. 
Respectfully submitted this <* ^  day of October, 1985 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
NICHOLAS E. HALES 
assistant Attorney General 
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s in a Spin-Off Distribution of Stock: 
Parent-Respondent, a publicly owned company, creates a subsidiary. Respondent contributes a small anrxint 
;>f capital to the subsidiary and receives in return, all of the outstanding stock of the subsidiary; thereby 
creating a wholly-owned subsidiary. Hie subsidiary is privately-owned at that point. 
Tve Respondent then distributes the stock of the subsidiary to its shareholders in the form of a partial 
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